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Auctions are among the oldest economic institutions in place–they have been used
since antiquity to sell a wide variety of goods. Their basic form has remained
unchanged–an extraordinary feat stemming from simplicity in practice and remark-
able economic properties, the most important of which are capacities to generate high
revenues to the seller and to allocate goods eﬃciently.
The design and analysis of selling mechanisms that obtain eﬃciency–a require-
ment that the good is to be sold to the buyer who values it the most–was almost
exclusively a theorist’s concern, but this is rapidly changing. The most prominent
source of interest is apparent successes of auctions in large-scale privatization activi-
ties in many countries of the world, including the United States, the United Kingdom,
Russia, and China.1 In many of these auctions, the seller (typically a government)
explicitly declares eﬃciency as the main objective. The most important problem is
to ﬁnd or design an auction that is eﬃcient under particular circumstances and is
simple enough to use.
As known from theory, in the private values setting–when no buyer’s private
information aﬀects how others value the assets–many auction forms are eﬃcient:
second-price sealed-bid or open ascending price (English) auctions when one unit of a
good is for sale, the Vickrey or Ausubel auctions when many units of the same good
are being sold, and many other forms under speciﬁc circumstances (Vickrey (1961),
Milgrom & Weber (1982), Ausubel (2002)). When very valuable assets are being
oﬀered for sale, the interdependent values setting–when a buyer’s private information
can be essential in how others are evaluating the assets–seems to be a more plausible
description of the environment. For instance, Porter (1995) reports that in U.S.
oﬀshore oil and gas lease auctions, “ﬁrms are permitted to gather seismic information
prior to the sale.... On-site drilling is not permitted, but ﬁrms owning adjacent
tracts can conduct oﬀ-site drilling, which may be informative.” Clearly, other ﬁrms
might be interested in the results of such private tests.
In the interdependent values setting, achieving eﬃciency is a highly non-trivial
problem. All simple auction forms (with a remarkable exception of the English auc-
t i o n )t h a ta r ee ﬃcient in the private values setting cease to be eﬃcient if the values
are interdependent, even in the case of a single unit for sale. In practice, many units
of the same good are often being auctioned simultaneously; spectrum licences is a
typical example. Direct simultaneous or sequential application of single-unit eﬃcient
auctions for sale of multiple units does not produce an eﬃcient outcome except under
very special circumstances. Known mechanisms that are eﬃcient under most general
conditions are complex and almost prohibitively unsuitable for actual implementa-
tion.
1For example, the sale of air, the third-generation mobile-phone licence auction conducted by
the British government, raised an estimated 34 billion dollars for ﬁve licences or 2.5% of GNP (see
Binmore & Klemperer (2002)).
1In this paper, I consider a situation when M units of the same good are oﬀered
for sale. Each bidder’s marginal valuation for an additional unit is non-increasing in
the number of units in possession, so the units are substitutes for the bidders. Each
bidder receives a one-dimensional private signal that might aﬀect marginal valuations
of the others.2 To allocate eﬃciently in this setting is to assign units to the bidders
with M highest ex post marginal values.
I present a mechanism that consists of a number of sequential single-unit English
auctions. The distinctive feature of the mechanism is that the winners and the prices
they pay are determined separately. The main result is that the proposed auction
with the English auction with reentry introduced in Izmalkov (2003) as the primary
mechanism has an ex post equilibrium that is eﬃcient under multi-unit versions of
the single-crossing and signal intensity conditions. Similarly to the single-unit case,
the single-crossing condition is necessary for eﬃciency–without it the direct eﬃcient
mechanism or the generalized Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism that is in-
dividually rational and balances the budget does not exist, and the signal intensity
condition is relatively weak. The proposed auction is ﬂexible enough: any single-
unit eﬃcient mechanism–an English auction with or without reentry, or the Vickrey
auction in the case of two bidders–can serve as a building block to obtain eﬃciency
under corresponding multi-unit conditions.
The main diﬃculty in constructing an eﬃcient mechanism in the interdependent
values setting is that it must guarantee that the winners pay the Vickrey prices. Perry
& Reny (1999) present a revenue equivalence theorem establishing the uniqueness of
the marginal prices under ex post incentive compatibility. Therefore the prices paid by
the winners have to be the same as in the VCG mechanism. The existence of the direct
eﬃcient auction under the single-crossing condition was indirectly shown in Crémer
& McLean (1985); Ausubel (1999) contains a complete description of the mechanism.
A drawback of the direct mechanism is the requirement that the auctioneer knows
everything that the bidders know about each other. Dasgupta & Maskin (2000) oﬀer
a remarkable detail-free “contingent bid” mechanism: a bidder submits prices she is
willing to pay for diﬀerent numbers of units conditional on the realized values of all
the other bidders; the auctioneer then calculates a ﬁxed point, and declares winners
and prices. The mechanism allocates eﬃciently under the multi-unit single-crossing
condition (the same as for the direct mechanism), and can be applied for sale of non-
identical goods. It is complex, though, both strategically and computationally: even
if a single unit is being sold each player has to submit to the auctioneer a function of
N − 1 variables (N is the number of bidders).
The Vickrey price a winner is obliged to pay for her kth unit is obtained by
the following counterfactual exercise. The true signal of the winner is lowered until it
2As indicated in Maskin (1992) and as a direct corollary to the results of Jehiel & Moldovanu
(2001), if the private information received by the bidders prior to the sale is multi-dimensional,
no individually rational, incentive-compatible, budget-balancing, and at the same time eﬃcient
mechanism exists unless this information can be summarized by a one-dimensional signal.
2reaches a level at which her kth marginal valuation becomes equal to the (M−k+1)th
highest of the marginal valuations of the others. If the bidder were to have this
particular signal, the auctioneer would have been indiﬀerent between allocating a
unit to the bidder (kth for her) or to somebody else. The price the bidder is obliged
to pay for this unit is the kth marginal value, or, equivalently, the (M − k +1 ) th
highest of the marginal valuations of the others, calculated at this “virtual” signal.
In the private values setting, in the process of ﬁnding the Vickrey prices, the
ranking of the marginal values of the others is preserved when the signal of one of
the bidders changes. This allows for the open ascending counterpart of the Vickrey
auction, proposed in Ausubel (2002), to work. The Ausubel auction, which is a multi-
unit extension of the English auction, relies on the clinching rule. A bidder clinches
(wins) a unit at the price when some other bidder reduces her demand and the sum
of total demands of all the others becomes lower than the number of units available.
Immediately thereafter, the total number of units available and the demand of the
winner are reduced by one. If no other bidder clinches at this price, the auction
continues until all units are allocated.
In the interdependent values setting, since the ranking of the marginal values of
the others can change when the signal of some bidder increases, the Ausubel auction
generically cannot provide the Vickrey prices and so cannot be eﬃcient.3 Perry &
Reny (2001) recognize that the Ausubel auction is eﬃcient in the important special
case of only two bidders in the auction. They propose an open ascending price auction,
in which at a given price bidders submit directed demands against each of the other
bidders. A bidder clinches a unit when the sum of demands of the others directed
at her becomes less than the number of remaining units. When calculating demand
against bidder j, bidder i uses information she inferred about private signals of all
the others except j from the prices those bidders reduced their demands at. Bidders’
values are supposed to be non-degenerate for all M units, so at the start the demand
of every bidder against any other bidder is equal to M. As a result, at the moment
a bidder clinches a unit, the signals of all the others are truthfully revealed in the
proposed equilibrium. Since each pair of bidders literally engages in the two-bidder
eﬃcient auction with the signals of the others being ﬁxed, the winners clinch their
units exactly at the Vickrey prices, and so Perry & Reny (2001) obtain an eﬃcient
auction.
Perry & Reny (2002) present another construction of an eﬃcient mechanism in the
interdependent values setting, which is a generalization of the Vickrey auction and is a
sealed-bid relative of Perry & Reny (2001).4 Recognizing that in the interdependent
values setting the Vickrey auction is eﬃcient with only two bidders present, they
propose a two-stage auction. In the ﬁrst stage players make public announcements
in any way that reveals their true signals. For example, they may announce their
3The exact conditions for eﬃciency of the Ausubel auction are not yet known.
4Es˝ o (1999) contains a mechanism that is similar to the one in Perry & Reny (2002). In it, each
of the pairs engages in the English auction instead of the sealed-bid Vickrey auction.
3signals directly. In the second stage, all possible pairs of bidders are formed, and
each pair plays the Vickrey auction. After all the bids are submitted, an allocation
and payments are determined. First, the units are assigned one by one to the bidders.
Eventually, excluding ties, a bidder wins at least k units if the combined number of
bids she does not defeat with her kth highest bid in each of the N − 1 auctions she
participates does not exceed M−k. After all units are assigned, prices are determined.
Aw i n n e ro fK units pays the sum of Mth, (M − 1)th,...,(M − K +1 ) th highest
among the bids submitted against her in all N−1 auctions she participated combined.
Perry & Reny (2002), Perry & Reny (2001), and Es˝ o (1999) share a common
feature–bidders compete in pairs. While this allows to achieve eﬃciency, the number
of bids or demands of a particular bidder depends on N. The construction presented
here has a signiﬁcant advantage over these mechanisms: all bidders compete simul-
taneously in each of the single-unit auctions. Therefore, at any given moment any
bidder has at most one demand for a single unit, and so the complexity of the bid-
ding is similar to the complexity of the English auction. The total number of auctions
conducted and so the combined number of bids submitted by each bidder does not
depend on the number of bidders. Note also that when M =1the auction presented
here–unlike the other mechanisms–reduces to a single-unit English auction.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the considered setup in
detail. Section 3 introduces the multi-unit auction. Section 4 contains results. Section
5c o n c l u d e s .
2 Preliminaries
The environment considered here is the multi-unit extension of the environment of
Izmalkov (2003). There are M homogeneous units of some good oﬀered for sale.
There are N potential buyers, each of whom receives a private signal si ∈ [0,1].L e t
N denote the set of buyers. Given the signals s =( s1,s 2,...,s N),t h em a r g i n a lv a l u e
of the kth unit to bidder i is V k




i (s)−p. The valuation functions {V k
i }k=1..M
i=1..N are assumed to be
commonly known among all the bidders. How signals are distributed and whether that
distribution is commonly known among the bidders is not important for the results
since the equilibrium presented here is an ex post equilibrium (see Appendix A.1 for
the deﬁnition and discussion). It is important that the signals are one-dimensional
(see Footnote 2); [0,1] is only a normalization, the support need not be bounded as
long as the value functions are bounded.
For any player i value functions V k
i have the following properties: for any k, V k
i
is twice-diﬀerentiable, V k
















i for all k<M . (2)
Denote Vk to be the proﬁle of value functions V
ki
i picked for every bidder i ∈ N
according to vector k =( k1,...,k N).I fe v e r yb i d d e ri ∈ N has been assigned (ki−1)
units, then proﬁle Vk is the set of marginal valuations of all bidders for an additional
unit.
We call k admissible if ki ≥ 1 for all i and 0 ≤
PN
i=1(ki − 1) <M , that is the
total number of “allocated” units is less than M.G i v e nk, one can deﬁne winners’
circle Ik(s) as the set of bidders with maximal values at s according to Vk(s).
We also assume that for any admissible k, a player with the lowest possible own
signal, si =0 ,c a n n o tb ea“free rider”–have the highest value at s (unless s = 0)
according to Vk(s), and that the set of functions V
kJ
J (s) is regular at sJ for any




dsJ 6=0 ,w h e r esJ and s−J denote signals of bidders
from J and N\Jcorrespondingly, s =( sJ,s−J).5
The main result relies on the following multi-unit versions of the single-crossing
(A1) and signal intensity (A2) assumptions.6












A2M (signal intensity) For any admissible k,f o ra l ls and i ∈ Ik(s) there exists an
ε>0 such that for all s0 satisfying (i) si <s 0





j (s) and (iii) ∀l/ ∈ Ik(s), s0
l = sl, it is the case that Ik(s0)={i}.
The signal intensity condition requires that if we increase the signal si of some
member i of the winners’ circle Ik(s) and change the signals sj of other players
j ∈ Ik(s) in a way that their marginal values are unchanged, oﬀsetting the eﬀect of the
change in si,t h e ni’s marginal value, V
ki
i ,g o e su p( t h es i g n a l so fa l lp l a y e r sl/ ∈ I(s)
are kept ﬁxed). In other words, the combined eﬀect on player i’s marginal value,
directly from the increase in her own signal and indirectly through the changes in
5Regularity guarantees that equilibrium strategies are well deﬁned. The “no free riders” assump-
tion together with V
ki
i (0)=0are to ensure complete and analytically attractive consideration of
the most general case. When these are not satisﬁed, a similar analysis can be provided (assumptions
A1M and A2M below will need to be strengthened somewhat), which will give a rise to the existence
of “waiting” eﬃcient equilibria, where one of the players’ strategy at some point of the auction is to
“wait” (or stay forever) until some other bidder exits the auction.
6For detailed description, discussion, and comparison of these assumptions the reader is referred
to Izmalkov (2003).
5signals of other members of the winners’ circle, is positive: the direct eﬀect outweighs
the indirect eﬀect.
It is useful to view the signal intensity condition as a dual to the single-crossing
condition. Single-crossing prescribes what should happen if we ﬁxt h esignals of
everyone else in the winners’ circle and increase the signal of one particular player–
she should become the sole member of the winners’ circle. Signal intensity prescribes
what should happen if we ﬁxt h evalues of everyone else in the winners’ circle and
increase the signal of one particular player–again, she should become the sole member
of the winners’ circle.
Note that these conditions are required to be satisﬁed only for admissible k–
in situations when less than the total number of units has been “allocated.” The
single-crossing condition in this “weak” form is the same condition that is required
in Dasgupta & Maskin (2000), and that guarantees existence of the direct eﬃcient
mechanism.
The diﬃculty in allocating multiple units eﬃciently via simple mechanisms arises
from the fact that the prices the winners have to pay are not easily determined. If
the mechanism has an ex post equilibrium that is eﬃcient, it has to ensure that every
winner pays the Vickrey price–the same price she is obliged to pay in the generalized
VCG mechanism.
To illustrate the associated problems consider a simple situation when there are
o n l yt w ou n i t sf o rs a l ea n dt h r e eb i d d e r s . S u p p o s et h a ta tap a r t i c u l a r(s1,s 2,s 3)
bidders 1 and 2 have the ﬁrst and the second highest marginal values among all the
bidders–they have to be the winners if eﬃciency is the allocation principle. The
Vickrey price, p1,t h a tb i d d e r1 has to pay for her unit, is equal to her marginal value
for the ﬁrst unit, V 1
1 (s1
1,s−1),w h e r es1
1 is the signal at which V 1
1 (s1
1,s−1) is equal to
the second highest of all marginal valuations of bidders 2 and 3.W h e n v a l u e s a r e
interdependent, the ﬁrst highest valuation of the other bidders at (s1
1,s−1) need not
be V 1
2 .T h i ss c e n a r i om a ya r i s ei nas i t u a t i o nw h e nV 1
2 is more sensitive to the value
of s1 than V 1
3 is.
Suppose that it is indeed the case that V 1
2 (s1,s−1) >V1





1,s−1). Suppose also that the marginal valuations for the second unit are equal
to 0 for each of the bidders at any s.
Then, as follows from continuity of the value functions and from (A1M), an eﬃ-
cient mechanism has to assign one unit to bidder 1 when her signal is s1 and when
her signal is only slightly above s1
1, and assign the other unit to bidder 2 in the ﬁrst
case and to bidder 3 in the second case. To determine correctly the winners, and at
t h es a m et i m et oc h a r g et h es a m ep r i c ep1 to bidder 1 in the two cases–is practically
a hopeless task for a dynamic mechanism such as an open ascending price auction.
This is exactly the reason why the Ausubel auction fails to be eﬃcient when values
are interdependent. Indeed, in both cases bidder 1 h a st ow i nau n i ta tp = p1.T h i s
c a nh a p p e no n l yi fo n eo ft h eb i d d e r s2 and 3 reduces her demand to 0 at p1,b u t
6then that bidder would not be able to win when the signal of bidder 1 is such that it
is eﬃcient to do so.
An assumption that each bidder demands at most one unit is important for the
above argument, and it does not comply with (1). The fact that the signals of the
bidders may be revealed in the early stages of the bidding, prior to any unit being
clinched, seems to provide an opportunity for the coordination among the bidders on
who should win and who should exit at certain prices. This is not correct in general
due to an additional fact that the Vickrey prices are generically diﬀerent among the
bidders. As a result, particularly in the case when marginal valuations for the ﬁrst
unit of all the bidders are the three highest marginal valuations at almost all s,t h e
Ausubel auction is not eﬃcient. Indeed, even if all the signals are revealed before any
o ft h eu n i t sa r ec l i n c h e d ,a tt h ep r i c et h eﬁrst unit is assigned the demands of each of
t h eb i d d e r sa r ee q u a lt o1. One of the bidders reduces her demand to 0 at this price,
and the winner is randomly determined among the other two bidders. The price the
winner pays cannot be the Vickrey price for both bidders since those are diﬀerent.
To summarize, in an eﬃcient mechanism, winners are determined by comparison
of marginal values at the actual s, while the prices they have to pay are determined
separately, under a counterfactual exercise–bidder i has to pay for the kth unit she
won the price pk
i that is equal to her marginal valuation V k
i (sk
i,s−i),w h e r esk
i is
the signal with which she would marginally win k units: V k
i (sk
i,s−i) is equal to the
(M − k +1 ) th highest of the marginal valuations of the others.
The proposed auction separates processes of determining winners and prices, and
by doing so achieves eﬃciency.
3A n e ﬃcient multi-unit auction
3.1 Structure
Overview. The proposed mechanism consists of a series of sequential single-unit
English auctions with reentry. These auctions are subdivided into two phases. Phase
1 is composed of M auctions, each deciding a winner for one of the units. During
Phase 2 the prices the winners have to pay are determined. The number and particular
details of the auctions in Phase 2 depend on the results of Phase 1.
Rules. Each individual auction is conducted according to the rules of the English
auction with reentry. The full set of rules is presented in Appendix A.2.1. The
following is the abridged version that captures all essential features. The full set
diﬀers only to the extent it accounts for all technical complications related to multiple
simultaneous entries and exits.
1. The auctioneer sets a low initial price, say zero, and constantly raises it. It is
convenient to think of an automatic price clock publicly showing the current
price.
7Auction 1: α1 =( 0 ,0,...,0) - winner:
bidder j ∈ N
Auction 2: α2 =( 0 ,...,1
j
,...,0) - winner:













i = M − 1 - ···
Figure 1: Phase 1
2. At any price, each bidder is either active (willing to buy the unit at this price)
or not. All bidders are active at a price of zero. As the price increases any
bidder can exit (become inactive) and reenter (become active) the auction at
will. The activity statuses of all bidders are commonly observed and known.
3 .T h ea u c t i o ne n d s( t h ep r i c ec l o c ks t o p s )w h e na tm o s to n ep e r s o ni sa c t i v e .
The winner is the only remaining person (or is randomly chosen among those
who exited last) and pays the price at which the last exit took place.
The identity of the winner and the winning price are publicly announced after each
individual auction. So, before the start of a particular auction all public information
of every previous auction is commonly known.
Phase 1. This phase spans M auctions. The units are sold one-by-one. The
winner of each of the auctions is assigned a unit.
It is convenient to think that before the start of each of the auctions the auctioneer
announces how many units have been already assigned and to whom. Let αm =
(αm
1 ,...,α m
N) denote the announcement of the auctioneer at the start of auction m,
where αm




m − 1,a n dα1 =( 0 ,...,0). The outline of Phase 1 is shown in Figure 1.
Phase 2. As a result of Phase 1 all M units are assigned to the bidders. All
bidders who have won at least one unit are arbitrarily ordered. According to this
order, for every winner a number of auxiliary auctions is conducted to determine the
8price for each unit won by this bidder. Suppose bidder j ∈ N has won K units. Then
for each of her units, from 1st to Kth, the following procedure applies, outlined in
Figure 2.
The price for the kth unit won by bidder j, pk
j,i sd e t e r m i n e da sf o l l o w s .A tt h e
start of auxiliary auction 1, the auctioneer announces α1 =( 0 ,...,k− 1
j
,...,0)–as
if bidder j has won k−1 units, while any other bidder has won no units. A single-unit
English auction with reentry is conducted with a restriction on the strategy of bidder
j: she is prohibited from exiting, and so bidder j necessarily wins. Let A1 be the
set of runners-up–those bidders who exited last, at price p1. Most likely but not
necessarily, set A1 is a singleton. Each runner-up is “assigned” a unit. If the total
number of units “assigned” equals or exceeds M,
PN
i=1 α1
i +#A1 = k−1+#A1 ≥ M,
then pk
j is determined, it is equal to p1.
Otherwise, auxiliary auction 2 is conducted with the announcement α2,w h e r e
α2
i = α1
i +1for every runner-up i ∈ A, α2
i = α1
i for i 6∈ A, and the restriction that
bidder j necessarily wins. Every runner-up is “assigned” a unit, .... This is repeated
until as a result of auxiliary auction m,
PN
i=1 αm
i +#Am equals or exceeds M,w h e r e
Am is the set of runners-up. Price pk
j i ss e tt ob ee q u a lt opm. Since there is always
at least one runner-up, the total number of auxiliary auctions required to determine
pk
j does not exceed M − k +1 .
3.2 An illustration
Here we preview how the presented mechanism is supposed to work and provide an
example. The complete proof is in Section 4.
In the beginning of every auction in Phase 1, the bidders know how many units
were previously allocated and to whom. At the start of auction m they obtain vector
km, where for every bidder i, km
i = αm
i +1 .I n a u c t i o n m, therefore, bidder i is
bidding for her kith unit, so Vkm is an accurate representation of the value functions
according to which bidders are going to bid. If the bidders follow the suggested
strategies–the strategies that form an eﬃcient equilibrium in each of the single-unit
auctions according to Vkm, then the winner of auction 1 is the bidder with the highest
marginal value among all the bidders, the winner of auction 2 is the bidder with the
second highest value, and so on–the eﬃcient allocation is obtained.
In Phase 2, during the procedure to determine pk
j, before the start of auxiliary
auction m, bidders can calculate km = αm +1. If all the bidders, except j (she does
not exit), follow the suggested strategies according to Vkm,b i d d e rj wins at price pm,
at which pm = V k
j (sm
j ,s−j)=m a x i6=j V
ki
i (sm
j ,s−j) for some signal sm
j .A f t e rt h eﬁrst
auction, if the number of runners-up is n1 =# A1,t h ev a l u eV k
j (s1
j,s−j) of bidder
j is equal to the (n1)th highest of the marginal values of the remaining bidders. If
(k − 1) + n1 ≥ M,o rn1 ≥ M −k +1 , the price is calculated, pk
j = p1. Otherwise all
runners-up are “assigned” one unit each, and another auction is conducted with the
9Auction 1: α1 =( 0 ,...,k− 1
j
,...,0) - winner: j,p r i c e :p1
runners-up: A1 ⊂ N
P
α1
i +# A1 <M - pk
j = p1 no ¾ α2
i = α1
i +1 ,i ∈ A1
α2
i = α1
i,i / ∈ A1
yes




i ≤ M − 1 - winner: j, price: pm





i +# Am <M - pk
j = pm no ¾ α
m+1
i = αm




i ,i / ∈ Am
yes
© © © © © © © ¼
···
?
Figure 2: Phase 2
announcement α2, and so on. As we will show, in auxiliary auction m,t h eﬁnal price,
pm, does not exceed any of the prices from the previous auctions, and so the marginal
value of any runner-up in the previous auctions for the corresponding unit calculated
at (sm
j ,s−j) is not lower than pm.T h e r e f o r e ,V m
j (sm
j ,s−j) is equal to the nth highest
of the marginal values of the others, where n is the number of runners-up in the
current and all previous auxiliary auctions, n =
Pm
l=1 nl, nl =# Al. The procedure










i + nm =( k − 1) +
Pm
l=1 nl = k − 1+n,w eh a v et h a tn ≥ M − k +1 .
Therefore, if pk
j is set to equal pm = V k
j (sm
j ,s−j), it is also equal to the (M −k+1)th
highest of the marginal values of the others, and so pk
j is the Vickrey price.
The argument that the collections of the above strategies for each bidder form
an ex post equilibrium is based on the following two main principles that are at the
core of the presented construction. First, none of the winners in Phase 1 can aﬀect
the prices they have to pay for the units they won, since each winner is required to
stay active in the corresponding auxiliary auctions and, thus, cannot aﬀect the prices
she has to pay. Therefore, only the number of units won in Phase 1 matters for the
ﬁnal payoﬀ. Second, by virtue of the Vickrey prices, if the marginal valuation of the
bidder for a given unit is among the M highest for all the bidders, then the Vickrey
price for this unit is not higher than the value, otherwise it is not lower. Therefore, if
10a bidder wins more units that she is supposed to according to the eﬃcient allocation,
she pays more for additional units than receives in value. Similarly, if a bidder wins
less units than she should, she forfeits some proﬁts.
The following example illustrates how the proposed auction operates.
Example 1 Suppose there are two units of the good oﬀered for sale with three bidders
interested. Their value functions are:
V 1









3 = s3,V 2
3 = 1
2s3.
Suppose that si ∈ [0,100] for each bidder i =1 ..3. It is routine to verify that (A1M)
and (A2M) hold.
Consider a particular proﬁle of realized signals, s =( 6 0 ,20,35). The two highest
marginal values are V 1
1 =6 0and V 1
2 =4 0 , so both bidder 1 and bidder 2 have to win
o n eu n i te a c ht oo b t a i na ne ﬃcient allocation.
Phase 1 consists of two auctions. In the ﬁrst auction, the auctioneer announces
α1 =( 0 ,0,0),s ok1 =( 1 ,1,1), and each player bids according to V 1
i .B i d d e r 1
and bidder 3 remain active until the price reaches their values, while bidder 2,w h e n
bidder 1 is active, infers that V 1
1 = s1 ≥ p and V 1
2 ≥ 20+ 1
3p. The strategy of bidder
2 (if bidder 1 is active) calls on her to remain active as long as p ≤ 20 + 1
3p,o ru n t i l
the price reaches 30. Therefore, bidder 2 exits ﬁrst at p2 =3 0 ,t h e nb i d d e r3 exits at
p3 =3 5=p1. Bidder 1 wins, she is assigned a unit.
In the second auction, the auctioneer announces α2 =( 1 ,0,0),s ok2 =( 2 ,1,1),
a n dp l a y e r sb i da c c o r d i n gt oV 2
1 ,V1
2 , V 1
3 . Similar to the above, bidders 1 and 3 stay
active untill the price reaches their values, and bidder 2 makes inferences about the
s1.N o w ,a tp, V 2
1 = 1
2s1 ≥ p implies V 1
2 ≥ 20+ 2
3p, and so bidder 2 stays active until
p =6 0if bidder 1 does not exit earlier. As a result, bidder 1 exits ﬁrst at p1 =3 0 .
After inferring s1,b i d d e r2 stays until the price reaches her value. She wins after
bidder 3 exits at p3 =3 5=p2 and is assigned a unit.
In Phase 2 the order at which p1
1 and p1
2 are determined is irrelevant. Suppose ﬁrst
p1
1 is being calculated. In the ﬁrst auxiliary auction (third overall), the auctioneer
announces α1 =( 0 ,0,0). This auction proceeds exactly as the ﬁrst auction in Phase
1, so there is actually no need to conduct it. In any case, the runner-up is bidder 3.I n
the second auxiliary auction (forth overall), the auctioneer announces α1 =( 0 ,0,1),
so k1 =( 1 ,1,2), and players bid according to V 1
1 ,V 1
2 , V 2
3 . Now it is bidder 3 who
exits ﬁrst at p3 = V 2
3 = 1
2s3 =1 7 .5. Then bidder 2 exits at p2 =3 0=p2,a n dt h i s
determines the price for the unit won by bidder 1, p1
1 =3 0 .T o v e r i f y t h a t t h i s i s
indeed the Vickrey price note that at V 1
1 = s1
1 =3 0 , V 1
2 =3 0 , V 1
3 =3 5and the other
marginal values are lower. So V 1
1 at s1
1 =3 0equals the second highest of the marginal
values of bidders 2 and 3.
11To determine p1
2,i nt h eﬁrst auxiliary auction (ﬁfth overall), the auctioneer an-
nounces α1 =( 0 ,0,0). This auction, however, proceeds diﬀerently than before since
bidder 2 has to remain active. As a result, bidder 3 exits ﬁrst at p3 =3 5 , then bidder
1 exits at p1 =6 0=p1. The second auxiliary auction (sixth overall) is conducted
with α2 =( 1 ,0,0), it will proceed exactly as the second auction of Phase 1.A s a
result, p2
2 =3 5 . It is straightforward to verify that this is the Vickrey price.
This example highlights why it is important to ensure that the winners pay the
Vickrey prices. If, suppose, bidder 1 had to pay the price that obtains in the auction
she wins the unit, p =3 5 ,s h ec a np r o ﬁtably deviate. Bidder 1 could exit at, say,
p =3 1and let bidder 3 win the unit. Then, in the second auction bidder 3 would
be bidding for her second unit, and so the auction would be similar to the second
auxiliary auction (forth overall) conducted to determine p1
1.I f t h e o t h e r s s t i c k t o
their strategies, bidder 1 would win the unit at p =3 0and gain. Note that then
bidders 1 and 3 would be the winners, which is not eﬃcient.
4R e s u l t s
Theorem 1 Under the multi-unit single-crossing and signal intensity conditions the
proposed multi-unit open ascending price auction has an ex post equilibrium that is
eﬃcient.
Proof. First, we deﬁne the equilibrium strategies. For every bidder i,t h ef o l l o w -
ing strategy is proposed:
1. At the beginning of each individual auction based on the announcement, α,
determine k and Vk–the proﬁle of value functions according to which bidder
i and the other bidders are supposed to bid in this auction: for each bidder
j ∈ N, kj = αj +1 .
2. In each individual auction follow the eﬃcient equilibrium strategy for the single-
unit English auction with reentry corresponding to Vk. The brief description
of the strategies and of the eﬃcient equilibrium construction is presented in
Appendix A.2.2.
If the bidders follow equilibrium strategies corresponding to selection Vk,T h e o -
rem 1 in Izmalkov (2003) shows that the winner of each individual auction is bidder



















j is a “virtual” signal of bidder j at which the (marginal) value of bidder j
exactly equals the highest of the (marginal) values of the others. Signal s0
j is uniquely
deﬁned by (5).
Second, we show that at the end of Phase 1, the winners are the bidders with
M highest marginal values. Indeed, by (4), the winner of the ﬁrst unit is the bidder
with the highest marginal value, the winner of the second unit is the bidder with the
second highest marginal value, and so on.
Third, we show that during Phase 2, the Vickrey prices are determined. Suppose
pk
j, the price bidder j has to pay for the kth unit she won, is to be determined. By














At pm, the bidders in Ikm(sm
j ,s−j), which includes bidder j and the group of runners-





i (·) for any 1 ≤ ki <k m











Consider any bidder l 6= j who is not a runner-up, l 6∈ Ikm(sm
j ,s−j).I f km
l > 1
then, for each kl such that 1 ≤ kl <k m
l , bidder l must have been a runner-up in one
of the previous auctions, say auxiliary auction r<m . In that auction, kr
i ≤ km
i for



























j,s−j) from (7) imply
that sr
j ≥ sm











How many bidders have their marginal values higher or equal to V k
j = pm at
(sm
j ,s−j)?F o re a c hi 6= j and 1 ≤ ki <k m
i , V
ki




Combined, we have that
P
i6=j(km
i − 1) + #Am =
P
i6=j αm
i +# Am marginal values
of the bidders other than j a r eh i g h e ro re q u a lt oV k
j . The procedure stops once P
i∈N αm
i <M,w h i l e
P
i∈N αm
i +# Am ≥ M.S i n c e
P
i∈N αm




this is exactly the moment when
P
i6=j αm
i +#Am ≥ M−k+1.T h u s ,pm = V k
j (sm
j ,s−j)
is equal to the (M −k +1)th highest marginal value of the other bidders, so pl
j ≡ pm
is the Vickrey price.
At last, we argue that the proposed strategies form an equilibrium. By construc-
tion of Phase 2, no bidder can aﬀect her payoﬀ at that moment. Thus, only the
number of units won in Phase 1 aﬀects ﬁnal payment. Since the resulting prices are
13the Vickrey prices, bidders receive non-negative payoﬀ for any additional unit as long
as the marginal valuation of that unit is one of the M highest. The payoﬀ from any
additional unit with marginal valuation not among the M highest is non-positive.
Indeed, pk
j = V k
i (sk
i,s−i) for the kth unit won by bidder j, and it is also equal to
the (M − k +1 ) th highest of the marginal valuations of the others calculated at
(sk
j,s−j). Therefore, at (sk
j,s−j), V k
j (sk
j,s−j) is exactly the Mth highest of the mar-
ginal valuations of all the bidders. By the single-crossing assumption, (A1M), if at
the true signals, V k
j (sj,s−j) is among the M highest marginal values, then sj ≥ sk
j
and V k
j (sj,s−j) ≥ pk
j;o t h e r w i s esj ≤ sk
j and V k
j (sj,s−j) ≤ pk
j. Thus, any deviation
that results in a diﬀerent number of units won cannot be proﬁtable.
The presented equilibrium is ex post.E v e ni fs are commonly known prior to the
auction, in each of the single-unit auctions the proposed strategies form an ex post
equilibrium, and, as follows from the above arguments, no proﬁtable deviations are
possible.
An important feature of the proposed mechanism is that the total number of
auctions is bounded from above by a number that depends only on M and not on the
number of participating bidders as in Perry & Reny (2002), where the total number
of two-bidder auctions in the second phase is N(N − 1)/2.I n d e e d ,P h a s e1 involves
M auctions, Phase 2 involves at most M ×M auctions–if every winner is a diﬀerent
bidder the maximal value of auxiliary procedures is M per bidder. Some auctions
need not be run. For instance, there is no need to repeat the ﬁrst auction in Phase 1.
T h el a s ta u c t i o ni nP h a s e1 immediately determines the Vickrey price that the winner
of the last auction has to pay, so for this bidder and her last unit no auxiliary auctions
in Phase 2 need to be conducted. Therefore, we have established the following:
Corollary 1 The total number of the single-unit English auctions needed to achieve
eﬃciency does not exceed M2.
Remark 1 The proposed mechanism is quite ﬂexible; it can be built upon any single-
unit eﬃcient auction with the appropriate multilateral extensions of assumptions. For
example, if the English auction without reentry, the model introduced in Milgrom &
Weber (1982) and extensively analyzed thereafter, is used as the primary auction,
then the presented mechanism has an ex post eﬃcient equilibrium if the generalized
single-crossing condition is satisﬁed for Vk for any admissible k.7
7Birulin & Izmalkov (2003) introduce the generalized single-crossing condition and show that it
is both a necessary and suﬃcient condition for eﬃciency of the English auction without reentry. In
the single-unit case it requires that: if starting from a signal proﬁle where the values of a group of
bidders are equal and maximal the signals of a subset of the group are increased slightly, then no
bidder outside of the subset can attain the value higher than the maximal value attained among
the bidders from the subset. The generalized single-crossing condition both implies the (pairwise)
single-crossing condition and reduces to it in the case of two bidders.
145 Concluding remarks
5.1 Variations
In the presented eﬃcient equilibrium, once the winner of the ﬁrst auction of Phase 1
drops for the ﬁrst time in the subsequent auctions, the signals of all the bidders are
revealed. Since in each individual auction players bid as if they learn their signals
anew, there is a lot of redundancy in the information exchange in the proposed mech-
anism. This suggests that the mechanism can be modiﬁed signiﬁcantly depending on
additional desirable properties without sacriﬁcing eﬃciency. I would like to mention
two directions for potential improvement: simplifying the structure and relaxing the
assumption.
Here are some changes that can be made to the proposed auction. Phase 1 can be
modiﬁed as follows. Conduct the ﬁrst auction as before, and suppose bidder j is the
winner. Then conduct the auction with the announcement (not an actual assignment)
that M − 1 units has been allocated to bidder j until she exits for the ﬁrst time. If
this happens, stop. As a result, the true signals of all the bidders are supposedly
inferred. Otherwise, bidder j wins all M units, in which case the minimal signal that
she may have to win all M units is inferred. Whether the winner has this inferred
signal or her true signal does not matter when determining the eﬃcient allocation
a n dt h eV i c k r e yp r i c e sa sl o n ga ss h eo b t a i n sa l lt h eu n i t s .
As a result of this “abridged” Phase 1, all necessary information (for the bidders,
not the auctioneer) to determine all the winners and the Vickrey prices is revealed.
Phase 2, then, can be conducted in any manner that ensures that the winners of all
the units pay the Vickrey prices. This, in turn, guarantees that the bidders do reveal
their information in Phase 1 and that the eﬃcient allocation is obtained. For example,
Stage 2 of the sealed-bid auction proposed in Perry & Reny (2002) or a simpler version
of the ascending auction proposed in Perry & Reny (2001) can be used. In the latter,
since the signals are supposedly revealed, there is no need to make inferences; the
bidders can simply reduce their demands in any manner that guarantees that every
winner j clinches her kth unit at the Vickrey price pk
j. Alternatively, the auctioneer
can ask each bidder to propose the allocation and the payments. If the reports of at
least N − 1 bidders coincide, they deﬁne the outcome, otherwise conduct one of the
a b o v ea l t e r n a t i v e st oP h a s e2. It is straightforward to show that the strategies to bid
as proposed in each of the auctions of Phase 1 and then to report the correct allocation
and the prices based on the revealed signals form an ex post eﬃcient equilibrium.
The proposed mechanism relies on the two main assumptions–the single-crossing
(A1M) and signal intensity (A2M) conditions. And while the single-crossing is indis-
pensable, the signal intensity is only necessary for the information processing to work
smoothly in each of the single-unit English auctions. Once the structure is modiﬁed,
(A2M) can potentially be relaxed. In particular, for the modiﬁed as above Phase 1
to work, it suﬃces to require (A2M)t ob es a t i s ﬁed only for a subset of admissible k:
15only for k =( 1 ,...,1) and k =( 1 ,...,M
j
,...,1) for any j ∈ N, since only auctions
corresponding to Vk for these k may be conducted in Phase 1. For Phase 2,( A2M)
is not required for the modiﬁcations proposed above.
While any of such modiﬁcations potentially simplify the structure of the game and
enlarge the space of applicability, whether it will be easier for the bidders to calculate
and follow equilibrium strategies is unclear. At the same time,
Remark 2 The structure of the proposed mechanism while potentially redundant is
uniform. Each of the single-unit auctions has the same structure, and the require-
ments imposed on the bidders are the same and simple. The bidders, in each of the
auctions, need only to decide whether they are willing to pay for an additional unit of
the good the price that shows on the clock or not given their inferences (beliefs) about
realized signals of the others at that time.
5.2 On incentives to follow equilibrium strategies
The proposed mechanism has the following weakness: after all the signals are re-
vealed, which happens quite early in the game, most of the bidders are indiﬀerent
between following the proposed equilibrium strategies and not participating. And, in
particular, during Phase 2, no bidder has strong incentives to participate. This is a
typical problem; to a somewhat lesser degree the same applies to Stage 2 of Perry &
Reny (2002) and to the ascending price auction of Perry & Reny (2001) after all the
bidders reduced one of their demands at least once.
The fact that the proposed auction has a uniform construction can actually help
to reduce this problem signiﬁcantly. Suppose that instead of bidding in person in
each of the individual auctions each player is required to submit a program to bid
in her place. Such programs would be required to be capable to bid in a single-unit
English auction with reentry. The only input to the programs at the start of each
individual auction is the announcement α by the auctioneer.
Clearly, a collection of programs that at each individual auction calculate k =
α + 1, and then follow the eﬃcient equilibrium strategies of the single-unit auction
corresponding to the selection Vk,f o r m sa nex post eﬃcient equilibrium–no bidder
is willing to change her program.
The major diﬀerence is that the programs can be copied, and so a new copy for
each of the bidders can be used in each of the auctions. As a result, the programs
would not have a knowledge of the information revealed in any of the previous auctions
and whether the currently conducted auction is the part of Phase 1 or Phase 2.T h e
only information from the previous auctions a program can infer is contained in the
announcement α. A bidder cannot beneﬁt from designing a program that infers such
i n f o r m a t i o ni fo t h e r ss u b m i tt h ep r o g r a m sa sproposed. In addition, the auctioneer, if
necessary, can conduct “bogus” auctions with arbitrary α to make any inferences out
16of α suﬃciently noisy. Therefore, each bidder will have strong incentives to submit
a program that in each individual auction follows the equilibrium strategy.
5.3 The private values setting
Continuing the argument of Remark 1, in the private values setting the second-
price sealed-bid auction can be chosen as the primary auction. Then, the presented
mechanism provides an alternative to the Vickrey auction. While the alternative
requires more bids to be submitted by each bidder, it also has an advantage–the
bidders disclose less information about their value functions than in the Vickrey
auction, where they reveal everything. Rothkopf, Teisberg & Kahn (1990) argue that
because of this the Vickrey auction is rarely used in practice: the bidders, fearing
that the seller or third parties can take advantage of them, have an incentive to shade
their bids.
In the proposed auction the above concern (while not eliminated) is reduced.
Compared to the combined number of bids, N ×M, in the Vickrey auction, the total
number of diﬀerent bids submitted by all the bidders in the sequential mechanism
does not exceed N+2M−2. This number corresponds to the worst-case scenario when
all the units are won by one bidder, and the next M highest marginal values belong
to some other bidder. If all units are won by diﬀerent bidders then the combined
number of bids does not exceed N + M, and only the winners of the ﬁrst M − 1
units and possibly the winner of the Mth unit reveal their top two marginal values.
It is interesting to note that in the Ausubel auction the bidders reveal the opposite
of what they do here–all of the bidders marginal valuations are disclosed except the
winning ones.
In the private values setting, since the ranking of the marginal values of the
others does not change when the signal and marginal valuations of a particular bidder
change, the need for auxiliary auctions is signiﬁcantly reduced. In Phase 1 there are
only M +1diﬀerent bids submitted by all the bidders; they coincide with the M +1
highest values among all the bidders. Auxiliary auctions can be constructed in such
a way that each additional auction determines the next highest value among all the
bidders. In the worst case scenario, when all the units are won by the same bidder,
since the price for her ﬁr s tu n i tn e e d st ob ee q u a lt ot h eMth highest among marginal
values of the others, 2M of the highest values of all the bidders need to be disclosed,
so only M − 1 additional auxiliary auctions need to be conducted. In the best case
scenario, when all M +1diﬀerent bids in Phase 1 come from M +1diﬀerent bidders,
no auxiliary auctions need to be run, and the price each winner pays is the price from
the last (Mth) auction.
175.4 Searching for the ultimate mechanism
What are the practical requirements for a selling mechanism? First, it has to achieve
its designed goal. Second, the weaker the set of conditions under which it operates
the better. Third, it has to be relatively transparent and simple to use. How does the
presented construction perform according to these criteria and how does it compare
to the existing constructions?
It is eﬃcient, so it works. Assumptions (A1M)a n d( A2M) are weak as argued in
Izmalkov (2003). The single-crossing condition, exactly in the (A1M) speciﬁcation,
is necessary for eﬃciency.8 The Perry & Reny (2002) mechanism and Perry & Reny
(2001) ascending auction use the “strong” form of the single-crossing, required to be
satisﬁed for any pair of bidders, not only for the members of the winners circle, and
not only for admissible k. It is not comparable with the presented pair of conditions.
The signal intensity condition, (A2M), imposes restrictions at exactly the same signal
proﬁles at which the “weak” single-crossing, (A1M), does. This set of proﬁles has
a measure of zero among the set of proﬁles on which the “strong” single-crossing is
imposed. In this sense, the conditions presented here are weaker. Moreover, they can
be further relaxed if variations of the presented mechanism are employed.
The proposed auction, since it is based on the English auction, is relatively trans-
parent and simple. It consists of at most M2 auctions, a number that does not depend
on N. The amount of information that is required to be carried from one auction to
another is minimal–only the identities of the winners or the runners-up depending
on the phase need to be known. Compared to the existing simple constructions it
has its advantages and disadvantages. Individual auctions in Perry & Reny (2002),
having only two bidders each, are much simpler, but the number of those is of the
order N2. An ascending auction in Perry & Reny (2001) allocates all units simultane-
ously, and that makes it attractive from the strategic point of view (every bidder has
s t r o n gi n c e n t i v e st op a r t i c i p a t ea tl e a s tf o rap a r to ft h ea u c t i o n ) ,b u ti ta l s or e q u i r e s
more from the bidders. Every buyer makes directed demands against all the others,
and the process of information updating is static–inferences occur only when some-
body adjusts her demands. This, in turn, necessitates imposing the “strong” form
of the single-crossing condition to achieve eﬃciency. Although simple and eﬀective,
this type of information processing does not seem to be “natural”–the fact that no
bidder changes his or her demands while the price has increased has to convey some
information.
Note also, that the presented construction reduces to the single-unit English auc-
tion with reentry when M =1 . This is unlike Perry & Reny (2002) and Perry &
Reny (2001), that are even with M =1have pairwise auctions or pairwise demands.
A su n d e r s c o r e di nM a s k i n( 2 0 0 3 ) ,t oﬁnd an open auction counterpart to the
Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism in the case of multiple goods for sale is a very
8The single-crossing is also suﬃcient for eﬃciency of the Dasgupta & Maskin (2000) and gener-
alized VCG mechanisms.
18important issue, and a great deal of work remains to be done. I believe that the
proposed construction is an important step on the way.
A Appendix
A.1 Ex post equilibrium
Deﬁnition 1 A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium β is called an ex post equilibrium if for
any realization of signals (types) s, even if s were commonly known strategies β would
form a Nash equilibrium.
The fact that an equilibrium is ex post implies that it remains an equilibrium for
any possible common prior distribution of the signals. Moreover, it is not necessary
that the bidders even share a common prior over the simple type space (the domain
of the signals) or any richer type space–an ex post equilibrium is a Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium on the universal type space (see Bergemann & Morris (2003)).
Therefore, by presenting an eﬃcient equilibrium that is ex post, we simultaneously
show that the equilibrium is robust to variations in each bidder’s assessment of a
distribution of the signals of the others, and relax the assumed information burden
on the bidder–it is no longer necessary to know or calculate what the distribution
of the signals of the others is to play according to the proposed equilibrium.
A.2 English auction with reentry
A.2.1 Rules
1. The auctioneer sets a low initial price, say zero, on a price clock and this is
raised.
2. While the clock is ticking, each player is either active, inactive or suspended.
All players are active at a price of zero. The activity statuses of all players are
commonly observed and known. The status of the player can change only when
clock is stopped. A player who is not suspended can stop the clock at any time
(say by raising his or her hand). A suspended player cannot stop the clock.
3. Once the clock stops:
(a) All suspensions are lifted.
(b) All players are asked to indicate their intention to be active or inactive
once the clock restarts. Players may also indicate that they are undecided.
These intentions are communicated to the auctioneer simultaneously and
observed by all.
19(c) Players who indicated their intention to be inactive or who were undecided
are asked if they wish to change their intentions in light of the information
revealed in (b). Undecided players are only allowed to indicate either that
they now wish to be active or that they are still undecided.
(d) If some player changes her intention, then (c) is repeated.
(e) If no player changes her intention, then these are considered the current
statuses. If only one player is undecided, then she must reconsider and
must choose to be either active or inactive. Others are not allowed to
change their statuses.
(f) The auctioneer suspends all undecided players if there are at least two
active players.
4. The clock restarts as long as there are more than two active players once all
players have chosen as in Rule 3. Otherwise, the auction ends and the good is
sold at the price showing on the clock. It is awarded to:
(a) The only remaining active person, if there is such a player.
(b) A randomly chosen player among those who exited last, if no active players
remain.
5. If the number of exits and entries of a player after her last suspension (if she
has been suspended before) or after the start of the auction (if she has never
been suspended before) exceeds a commonly known number, pre-announced by
the auctioneer, the player is automatically suspended at that price.9
To see how these rules work consider an auction with 5 players. Players 1 and 2
are active, player 3 is inactive and players 4 and 5 are suspended at the current price,
the price clock is ticking. Later, at a price p,p l a y e r1 stops the clock. According
to Rule 3 the suspensions of players 4 and 5 are lifted, and all players are asked to
indicate their intentions as in Rule 3b. Suppose players’ intentions are as follows:
player 2 wants to be active, players 1 and 5–inactive, and players 3 and 4 remain
undecided. These intentions are observed by all players. Rule 3c applies.
If no players are willing to change their intentions then player 2,a st h eo n l ya c t i v e
player, is declared the winner, the auction ends. Suppose instead, player 3, observing
that player 2 will be active, decides to be active as well, and she is the only player to
change her intentions in the second phase. As a result, the intentions of the players
are: players 2 and 3 want to be active, players 1 and 5 want to be inactive, player 4
is undecided.
9Note that the mechanism deﬁned by these rules is “detail-free”–the auctioneer is not required
to have or acquire any information about the value functions, distribution of the signals or the actual
realization of the signals to make the auction work.
20If in the next stage no player changes her intention, by Rule 3e player 4 is asked
to decide on her status. Once she decides, all players’ statuses are ﬁxed and, by
Rule 4, the clock restarts. Lastly, suppose that in the third stage, player 1 becomes
undecided, while player 5 changes her intentions to be active, and no other player
wants to change her intentions after this. Then both undecided players 1 and 4 get
suspended by Rule 3f, and the auction restarts with players 2, 3,a n d5 being active.
Note that Rule 3c ensures that after a ﬁnite number of stages no player will change
her intention.
A.2.2 Equilibrium construction
This is a brief summary of the equilibrium strategies and information processing in
the eﬃcient equilibrium of the single-unit English auction with reentry. For the com-
plete construction, including detailed description of the oﬀ-equilibrium information
processing, examples, the proof that the strategies are well-deﬁned, and, of course,
the proof that these strategies form an eﬃcient ex post equilibrium, see Izmalkov
(2003).
Histories: At any point of the auction, whether the price clock runs or is stopped,
the history of all actions that bidders or the auctioneer took prior to this point–stops
of the clock, intended choices, exits, entries, suspensions–is public and is common
knowledge among the bidders.10 The strategy of a bidder speciﬁes an action the
bidder takes or will take given current public history: the price at which the bidder
will stop the price clock if the clock is running provided no other bidder stops it
before, and the intended choice–be active, be inactive, or be undecided–if the clock
is stopped and given the current set of intended choices of all the bidders.
Running ahead, in the equilibrium, for any s but the set of measure zero, each
bidder intends to change her status when she stops the clock: exit–become inactive
if were active, or enter–become active if were inactive; and maintain her status when
some other bidder stops the clock. Only when the intentions of some bidder to be
active or inactive after a certain price depend on whether some other bidder exits or
enters at this price do the equilibrium strategies become richer. In what follows we
only describe the main part of the strategies.
Information processing: In the equilibrium bidders are constantly making infer-
ences about signals of the other bidders based on their bidding behavior.
Let A be the set of active bidders at some price p.T h eestimated minimal signals
at p, x(p)=( x1(p),x 2(p),...,x N(p)) are deﬁned as follows: (i) x(0) = 0;( i i )i f
j/ ∈ A, xj(p)=xj(pj),w h e r epj <pis the price at which player j last exited; (iii) for
all active players, xA(p)=( xi (p))i∈A is a solution to the system of equations
VA (xA(p),x−A(p)) = p. (8)
10In the sequential construction proposed here, the bidders would actually know all the histories of
the previous auctions but this is irrelevant to the equilibrium construction in each of the individual
auctions.
21Let wi(si,p) ≡ Vi(si,x−i(p)) be the estimated minimal value of the good to player i
w h e nt h ec u r r e n tp r i c ei sp.
The set of estimated minimal signals, x(p), carries all the necessary inferred in-
formation to determine the strategies of the bidders. The solution to the system (8)








which is unique given an initial condition. During the course of the auction, x(p) are
determined as follows. At p =0 , the set of active bidders is A = N.T h e s o l u t i o n
to (9), x(p), is calculated with the initial condition x(0) = 0. This continues until
some bidder exits, say at p0.T h e nA is updated and x(p) is further calculated with
the initial condition equal to the terminal condition of the previous system, and so
on. At any price level at which some bidder enters or exits, the set of active bidders,
A, is updated, and then a new system (9) is being solved with the initial condition
equal to the terminal condition of the previous system.
Equilibrium strategies: The proposed strategies are based on the estimated mini-
mal values wi(si,p) derived from the history of play up to price p.
Bidder i should:
1. if wi(si,p) >p , then be active at p;
2. if wi(si,p) <p , then be inactive at p;
3. if wi(si,p)=p and for ε small enough, wi(si,p−ε) ≤ p −ε and wi(si,p+ε) >
p + ε, then become active at p;
4. if wi(si,p)=p and for ε small enough, wi(si,p−ε) ≥ p −ε and wi(si,p+ε) <
p + ε, then become inactive at p.
The strategy can be summarized as: exit (enter) whenever your estimated min-
imal value crosses the price from above (below).
If bidders do follow these strategies, then for each bidder i ∈ N, xi(p) indeed
represents the minimal signal bidder i could have to be consistent with her status at
p,a n dwi(si,p) is the estimated minimal value of the good to player i at p.
Oﬀ-equilibrium information processing: If one of the bidders, say j,d e v i a t e sf r o m
the proposed strategies, this may aﬀect information processing and, potentially, the
actions of the others only when the observed action of bidder j is unexpected. There
are two main scenarios that can happen: bidder j does not (re)enter when expected,
and bidder j enters when not expected. By construction, (unexpected) exits do not
cause any problems.
In the ﬁrst case, bidder j is treated as being dormant. For the purposes of infor-
mation processing all the other bidders treat her as an active bidder starting from
22the price she was supposed to enter until the price she is supposed to exit based on
the previous information. It is important that xj(p) of bidder j is being updated in
the process.
In the second case, bidder j is treated as if she has entered by mistake. Bidder j
is expected to exit immediately, and xj(p) is not adjusted instantaneously. Instead,
xj(p) is being adjusted continuosly as long as bidder j stays active, in the manner
that ensures that at least some other bidder stays active, and so the auction does not
end before the full adjustment takes place.
The proof: The argument that these strategies form an equilibrium and that it is
eﬃcient is based on the fact that, by construction, no bidder can aﬀe c tt h ep r i c es h e
pays if she wins and if the others follow the proposed strategies. Moreover, this price
is the Vickrey price, and so, only for the bidder with the highest value at a given s,
this price does not exceed the value. Therefore, no proﬁtable deviation is possible for
any bidder: only deviations that change whether a bidder wins the good or not aﬀect
the bidder’s payoﬀ. The bidder forfeits positive gains if she does not win when it is
eﬃcient for her to win; she pays more than the value of the good to her if she wins
when it is eﬃcient to allocate the good to somebody else.
The argument that the equilibrium is ex post is trivial: at no point do the strate-
gies of the bidders depend on what they know or believe the distribution of the
signals of the others is. The proposed strategies form a Nash equilibrium even if s is
commonly known prior to the start of the auction.
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